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CHINA AND THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE 
OCEANS 
Charles H. Norchi* 
The contributors to this Symposium issue of the Oceans and Coastal 
Law Journal appraise a critical marine matter of our time: how China 
participates in the public order of the oceans.  The vast and intense ocean 
space is the locus of claims made by a wide array of participants of 
which China is a newly invigorated player.  Although traditionally a land 
power, China has a deep history of oceans activities.  As Henry Kissinger 
has written 
[I]n the early years of the Ming Dynast, between 1405 and 1433, 
China launched one of history’s most remarkable and mysterious 
naval enterprises: Admiral Zheng He set out in fleets of 
technologically unparalleled “treasure ships” to destinations as 
far as Java, India, the Horn of Africa, and the Straits of Hormuz.1  
At the time of Zheng’s voyages, the European age of exploration had not 
yet begun.2  China’s fleet possessed what would have seemed an 
unbridgeable technological advantage; in the size, sophistication, and 
number of its vessels, it dwarfed the Spanish Armada (which was still 
150 years away).3 
China has not recently risen as an entirely new power.  When 
Empires were supreme and nation-states embryonic China was a major 
actor.  Again as Kissinger notes, “[t]hrough many millennia of Chinese 
civilization, China was never obliged to deal with other countries or 
civilizations that were comparable to it in scale and sophistication.”4  
After a long period of relative ocean dormancy China again occupies a 
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seat at the global maritime table while compelling major and minor 
players to appraise deeply held identifications, expectations, and newly 
asserted demands.5  The role of a newly invigorated world ocean power 
in this contemporary post-bi-polar world of extremes and uncertainty is 
cause for reflection and appraisal.  
This Ocean and Coastal Law Journal Symposium appraises ocean 
claims in which China, the United States, and other actors are 
embroiled.6   The contributors are scholars and policy practitioners from 
China and the United States.  The appraisal of those claims and the 
policy solutions urged are inevitably informed by the standpoints of the 
contributors who are Chinese and American and who possess military, 
governmental, and academic backgrounds.  The reader will note certain 
contrasts in the contributors’ characterization of claims, understanding of 
history, interpretation of incidents, and framing of customary and 
conventional international law of the sea.  That, in itself, is an insight 
into the problem.    
China’s marine legal system is the subject of the contribution by 
Ms.Wu Jilu, a Senior Research Fellow at the China Institute for Marine 
Affairs.  She describes the trends in the evolution of China’s legal marine 
and maritime regime, identifies key challenges, offers projections, and 
considers future developments and the alternatives.  Her article 
emphasizes that understanding China’s complex marine legal framework 
requires a comprehensive and interdisciplinary analysis.  Against a 
backdrop of conflicting regional demands and claims, Ms. Jilu clarifies 
the formation and contemporary functioning of the marine legal system 
of China.  
To effectively unpack law and policy Harold Lasswell urged asking, 
“[w]ho says what, in which channel to whom, with what effect?”7  In that 
analytical tradition Jonathan G. Odom, a Commander and active-duty 
Judge Advocate in the U.S. Navy, considers the Chinese government’s 
flow of words and flow of behavior assessed against prescriptions 
expressed in the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS).  
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Commander Odom asserts that China’s rhetoric on law of the sea 
questions the existing international legal order.  Legal processes are a 
form of communication of which the rhetoric of national elites is a key 
component.  Commander Odom raises important questions about the 
intent of official rhetoric, the selection of target audiences, and plausible 
outcomes for the law of the sea.   
The South China Sea is critical for its natural resources, strategic 
position, and international navigation routes, which are the objects of 
conflicting claims.  Guifang (Julia) Xue, Director of The Institute for the 
Law of the Sea of the Ocean University of China, writes of expectations 
and claims that render the South China Seas an arena of intense 
competition and an area fraught with peril for world public order.  She 
examines foundational issues contributing to increasing competition and 
analyzes implications for Chinese interests.  Recent continental shelf 
submissions by South China Sea-bordering countries have augmented the 
competition in the region.  Ms. Xue appraises the legal value of China’s 
maritime boundary—commonly referred to as the U-Shaped Line—
tracing its historical evolution and trends in Chinese legislation.  Finally, 
Ms. Xue asserts that, in order to serve its long term national interests. it 
is vital for China to define its claims based on international law by 
bringing its claims into conformity with UNCLOS.   
Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, retired U.S. Navy Captain and Associate 
Professor in International Law at the United States Naval War College, 
examines a trend that he describes as China’s Great Wall at Sea.  Captain 
Pedrozo considers what he perceives as capitulation and appeasement to 
Chinese demands and claims in the South China Sea and beyond.  He 
posits that the United States has failed to take action in the face of 
Chinese objections to U.S. intervention in the South China, East China, 
and Yellow Seas, and expresses concern that regional states have been 
forced to yield to Chinese pressure.  Captain Pedrozo urges the United 
States and its allies to adopt immediate steps to counter China’s 
resurgence in its self-proclaimed zone of influence. 
Each contributor affirms that national elites and other actors who are 
examining state behavior, international incidents, and elite responses to 
them are now making critical decisions pertaining to China and the 
oceans.  “The law,” as Judge Hardy Dillard famously wrote, “is a 
constantly evolving process of decision-making and the way it evolves 
will depend on the knowledge and insights of the decision-makers."8  
Thus it is critical that such decision-makers draw upon intellectual maps 
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to be fully oriented to stark policy problems.  This Symposium 
contributes to that need.  
The law of the sea, as all law, is driven by subjective choices about 
appropriate goals and policies.  By appraising claims in conflict, by 
assessing diverging expectations and demands, and by evaluating how 
best to shape and maintain our oceans values, a common interest of the 
oceans can be clarified.  As Myres McDougal and William Burke wrote 
[t]he historic function of the law of the sea has long been 
recognized as that of protecting and balancing the common 
interests, inclusive and exclusive, of all peoples in the use and 
enjoyment of the oceans, while rejecting all egocentric assertion 
of special interests in contravention of general community 
interest.”9   
Whether the oceans demands and claims considered in this volume will 
be resolved in the common interest of the world community is an 
evolving question.  However the diversity of perspectives on China and 
the oceans that are presented in these pages cumulatively reveal a 
coherent picture of unresolved claims and ongoing challenges.  In so 
doing they underscore the urgent task of clarifying and achieving a 
common oceans interest.  This is critical for China, the United States, 
and the public order of the oceans.   
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